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Kpareto optimal social state is a distribution of goods such that
the goods could not be reallocated to make anyone better off
without making at least some person worse off. A situation in
which each person prefers her bundle of goods to any other
possible bundle is pareto optimal, but so is the situation in which
I have all of the goods (and they are all of some, even the most
minimal, value to me) and no one else has anything. Thus, consid-
ered alone, pareto optimality does not guarantee justice in the
distribution of goods on anyone's account of justice. However, a
pareto non-optimal distribution seems to cry out for improvement,
since a reallocation can make at least one person better off without
making anyone else worse off. Indeed, the individuals who would
be advantaged by these improvements might claim that it is only
just to require them. So pareto optimality also does not seem
unconnected to justice. In this paper I examine arguments for the
claim that justice requires pareto optimality.
To be clear, I am asking whether pareto optimality is a necessary
condition of justice in the distribution of goods. The situation in
which any one individual has all the goods, which is pareto optimal
provided that each good has some positive utility for that
individual, shows that pareto optimality cannot be a sufficient
condition for justice. But it remains an open question whether an
ideally just society would have to satisfy pareto optimality, or
whether pareto optimality is at least a regulative ideal for actual
societies seeking justice. The set of pareto optimal distributions
normally has many members, and thus is too indeterminate to give
us an adequate theory of justice by itself on formal grounds alone.
So we have to combine it with other criteria simply to get a full
theory of distributive justice. Not all possible criteria can be
combined with pareto optimality, however. If pareto optimality is
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incompatible with other necessary criteria of justice, then we shall
have to reject pareto optimality.
Support for the claim that pareto optimality is a criterion of
justice has come mainly from three directions: utilitarianism,
welfare economics, and contractarian moral theory. On the
utilitarian view, a society isjust if it maximizes the total or average
utility of the society, and on either account this implies that a just
society must meet the condition of pareto optimality. Though
maximization of utility generates a pareto optimal distribution,
utilitarians do not directly argue for it; pareto optimality is simply
a by-product of maximization of utility. For this reason, as well as
because I think utilitarianism does not provide an adequate
account of justice, I shall not consider utilitarianism further.
Welfare economics treats pareto optimality as a matter of
individual rationality, a matter of individuals preferring more
utility to less. Social choice theories commonly assert pareto
optimality as a condition of social rationality as well.
Contractarianism, especially in the theory of John Rawls, holds an
ambivalent relationship to the pareto optimality condition. Rawls
claims that justice is prior to pareto optimality ("efficiency" in his
terms), yet he seems to require it in arguing for the lexical version
of the difference principle. Another contractarian, David Gauthier,
presents an unambiguous argument for pareto optimality as a
condition of impartiality in the perfectly competitive market, and
then goes on simply to assume that it ought to be a condition of
justice outside that model.
I shall maintain that all of the arguments that have been put
forward for pareto optimality as a condition of justice rely on some
crucial idealization that makes them uninteresting arguments for
the actual world. In making this claim I am not dismissing the
usefulness of idealized models or hypothetical states of nature.
Both kinds of structures can teach us much about our world. But
not just any model or hypothetical state will do. The problem I
mean to raise is sometimes termed by economists "robustness": a
model is not robust when small changes in some parameter
(assumption) cause very large changes in the results. A model that
is not robust cannot be a good approximation to reality. If a model
lacks robustness, then it is not very useful unless it accurately
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represents, in that aspect of the model that lacks robustness, the
reality one is trying to capture. Thus I shall argue that the existing
models used to argue for pareto optimality as a criterion of justice
are not robust.
I shall also argue that pareto optimality nevertheless provides a
regulative ideal for a just society. My argument is a contractarian
argument, since I take it that justice arises as a set of agreed upon
constraints on individuals' self-interested behavior Only
contractarianism aims to show that the concerns of justice are
rational for all to adopt and adhere to. The argument I shall offer
does not depend on these claims about contractarianism, although
the practical value of the argument may. In adopting the constraints
of justice, I show that rational individuals will choose to regulate
themselves by the ideal of pareto optimality, and this will persuade
them to look to a wide range of alternative possible futures in
making social policies. Constraints on what individuals can know
about each other and their preferences and about possible futures
will lead me to argue that a contractarian theory of justice demands
democratic processes and dialogue to assure agreement and
compliance. The pareto criterion, as it can be applied in the real
world, will turn out to encourage progressive social policies.
The paper contains three sections. The first section examines
arguments for the pareto criterion from the perfectly competitive
market (PCM) model, including the welfare economists'
rationality argument and Gauthier's impartiality argument. I shall
show there that the arguments for the pareto criterion are not robust
to realistic adjustments of the idealized mode! from which the
argument is made. The second section examines arguments for the
pareto criterion from Rawls's original position (OP). I argue that
the hypothetical initial situation from which the arguments are
made also relies on crucial, false assumptions that cannot be
relaxed without compromising the conclusion that pareto
optimality is a criterion of justice. In the third and final section I
attempt to make the strongest argument for the pareto criterion that
avoids these idealizations. Critical examination of this argument
shows that it also fails to be robust. However, arguments made on
the way lead me to conclude that nonetheless pareto optimality is
a progressive regulative ideal in a just society.
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1. The Argument for Pareto Optimality from the PCM
The concept of pareto optimality, or efficiency as it is sometimes
called, was invented by Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist at
the turn of the century, as a way to compare states of affairs without
making the interpersonal comparisons of utility that utilitarianism
requires. Welfare economists avoid interpersonal comparisons of
utility mainly because they claim that utility is essentially private.
Thus they avoid making claims about total utilities in society,
fearing that they are meaningless sums. The pareto criterion has
three advantages over maximization of total or average utility for
a theory of justice. First, one can determine which state(s) are
pareto optimal without making interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity. All that matters for judgments about pareto optimality are
individuals' own preferences for different social states. Second,
pareto optimality is a weaker criterion than maximization of total
or average utility, and unlike them does not generally provide a
unique ideal distribution. Since many different distributions may
satisfy pareto optimality, holding pareto optimality to be a crite-
rion of justice need not imply that one holds a welfarist concep-
tion of justice; pareto optimality can be a necessary criterion of
justice in a view that takes other, non-welfarist criteria to be
equally necessary. Furthermore, believing that ethical judgments
are beyond their expertise, the only bases left by which welfare
economists could make comparative social policy judgments are
pareto optimality and related criteria.
Welfare economics has made remarkable progress with these
weak criteria. The two most important results of welfare
economics concern an idealized model of a market called the
perfectly competitive market (PCM). PCMs are characterized by
the following conditions:
C1. Resources are privately owned and privately consumed.
C2. Force and fraud does not exist.
C3. There are many buyers and sellers, and entry and exit to the
market is free, so that no one can act unilaterally, or collusively,
to affect prices.
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C4. Transactions (e.g., publicizing or gathering infonnation about
goods for exchange, shipping, preparation for consumption) are
costless.
C5. Individuals' utility functions are stable, monotonic (which
means that if any amount of a good ever raises an individual's
utility, no greater amount of the good would lower the utility), and
reflect transitive preference orderings.
C6. There are no externalities, that is, all costs and benefits of pro-
ducing or consuming a good are borne by the owner of the good.
C7. No transactions take place out of equilibrium.
Of course, the PCM model abstracts from reality in each of these
conditions. The condition that goods are privately owned and
consumed insures that no one takes another's interest as her own;
each acts in her own self-interest. This condition implies what is
sometimes called "non-tuism," and it rules out not only altruism,
but perhaps more importantly envy, as motivations for individual
actions. The requirement that utility functions be monotonic is
pretty accurate for most goods, especially when there is a resale
market. But it is well documented that individuals' preferences
often fail to be transitive. There are externalities in almost every
economic activity, and in the world these give rise to free riding,
public goods, political posturing, and lawsuits. Ideally a society
might be able to internalize many of them, but there will always
be some externalities. C7 requires that everyone know what equi-
librium prices are, and that any price below the equilibrium price
would be rejected by the seller, any price above by the buyer.
The other three conditions of the PCM rule out strategic
behavior, or acting in ways to bluff or confuse the other individuals
in the market. By prohibiting force and fraud from playing a role,
the PCM rules out taking the market to be a larger game, in which
illicit, extra-market behavior is figured in as a possible strategy,
one with great risks and great potential rewards, to be considered
in the light of rational self-interest. If transactions were costly, then
there might be an advantage in delaying or hiding infonnation so
that some advantageous trades would not be made. Finally, the
condition that no one can affect prices rules out monopolies and
oligopolies, so that there is no incentive for individuals to
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cooperate in small coalitions; in the PCM it is each person for
herself
In the PCM, individuals trade until all trades that are mutually
agreeable to the buyer and the seller have been made, since trades
are costless, they can get something they want better by trading,
and they have no fraud to worry about. The first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics tells us that in the PCM, individuals
seeking their own interests will reach a pareto optimal outcome.
WEI: In the PCM the outcome of free trade is pareto optimal.
This can be shown informally by supposing that the outcome is
not pareto optimal. Then there is at least one person who can be
made better off without making another worse off. Suppose that
person is Ed and he could be made better off by trading two of his
oranges to Evelyn for one of her apples, a trade that would not
make her worse off. Then (provided that there are no externalities)
by making the trade tbey make apareto improvement, that is, they
increase someone's utility without decreasing anyone else's, and
neither will see any reason not to. If there are any other potential
pareto improvements then they are made as well, by the same kind
of argument. If not, then there is no way to make anyone better off
without making another worse off, that is, the situation is pareto
optimal. Pareto optimal states are those in which the distribution
of goods is as effectively used to raise total welfare as it can be,
and in the PCM it is done without forcibly taking anything from
anyone. There are many such outcomes that we would not call just,
in particular if the starting point for trade was unfair or coercive.
Still, there is a connection to justice for anyone who thinks that
liberty^ is one component of it: WEI implies that pareto optimality
is a byproduct of the PCM, in which force and fraud as well as
government coercion is absent.
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics extends
the significance of pareto optimality for concerns of justice.
WE2: Any pareto optimal outcome can be achieved through the
PCM from some initial allocation of goods.
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In other words, if one chooses a particular pareto optimal alloca-
tion, say for reasons of equity, it could be reached through free
trade from some particular initial allocation, which can be arrived
at through lump-sum taxes and forced transfers. Beginning from
a fair initial allocation of goods, the PCM allows agents to come
to a new allocation, which everyone likes even better, through
freely entered trades, and this maximizes the social welfare that
can be achieved given the starting point. Since WE2 allows that
any pareto optimal end-state allocation could have been brought
about through the liberty of the free market, welfare economists
take it that pareto optimality is at least a weak criterion of justice,
justifying the market as the only just allocative mechanism. As
Hal Varian writes, "the interesting result of welfare economics is
that we can relate an end-state principle of justice—maximum
'social welfare'—to an allocative procedure—the market mecha-
nism."*^ This fact has often been used, controversially, to justify
the free market in the real world.
The view of most welfare economists is that since pareto
optimality can be had without sacrificing equity or other
distributional concerns, then it would be foolish not to take it. Who
could complain about a pareto improvement? This seems to be a
powerful appeal (though as stated not an argument from justice).
But it faces several key objections. First, the argument for pareto
optimality as a criterion of justice from WE2 does not extend
beyond the confines of the PCM. In the real world the conditions
of the PCM do not exist, and neither WEI nor WE2 hold. Perhaps
most significant is that there exist externalities. The existence of
externalities means that there will be beneficial trades that are not
made, and costs imposed on persons who are not party to trades.
The classic examples are lighthouses and pollution. Lighthouses
provide a valuable service to ship navigators, for which they would
be willing to pay if that were the only way that they could use it.
But the beam of light that the lighthouse sends is free for all who
see its beam to consume, so naturally, shippers will try to consume
it without paying for it. Knowing this, few would want to construct
lighthouses in a private free market, since they will bring about
financial loss for most of them. Hence there will be an
undersupply of lighthouses in the free market. Injustthe opposite
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way, too much pollution will be produced. Firms who pollute a
river, for example, are able to let their waste, which would
otherwise be costly to dispose of, run downstream freely, where it
becomes someone else's cost. The firm then can sell its product
without considering that cost, and the consumers of the product
will consume it without having to pay that cost. Since some of the
consumers would not pay the higher cost which includes waste
disposal, more of the product, and hence more of the pollution, is
created than there would be if the waste disposal cost were
internalized. The result of externalities is that the free market does
not lead to pareto optimality. Provided that there are enough
shippers who would pay something for it, if they could prevent
any non-payer from consuming it, a lighthouse could be
constructed which would make all of them better off without
making anyone else worse off. And provided that the pollution is
costly enough to the downstream neighbors, if they could prevent
the firm from freely using the river, a level of pollution that reflects
the costs and benefits to all could be chosen. But since there are
externalities in the world, and some of them cannot be internalized,
the link between the freedom of the PCM and pareto optimality is
broken. What is more, there is no proof that pareto optimality
can always be had without sacrificing equity, since WE2 does not
hold in the presence of externalities.
The welfare economists' argument tries to play both sides of the
libertarian-egalitarian debate. It claims that the PCM achieves
pareto optimality, and cites the PCM's lack of force and fraud in
appealing to the libertarian. It cites WE2 to show that an egalitarian
pareto optimal solution can be achieved through the market in
appealing to the egalitarian. But without some coercion, usually
in the form of lump-sum taxes and transfers, there is no guarantee
that the outcome of the untouched PCM will be just by the
egalitarian's standards (or those of anyone but the libertarian). So
either one sacrifices freedom (in the sense of the libertarian) for
equality, or equality (in the sense of the egalitarian) for freedom. ̂ ^
The welfare economist may not be bothered by this objection,
though. She maintains that we can always seek pareto
improvements once the initial distribution has been decided on. If
we are prevented from attaining an equal distribution of goods
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because of an unfair initial distribution, it still makes sense to make
the best of the situation and to seek pareto optimality. Her claim
is that pareto optimality is rationally required from any initial
point.
The claim that any pareto superior move is rationally required
can also be disputed, though, when one considers a dynamic
model. There are situations in which a rational individual might
not want society to make a pareto improvement for some strategic
reason. Suppose, for example, social policies are decided on by
majority rule voting. Suppose that the pareto improvement under
consideration does not benefit (and, of course, does not harm)
Theo, and that Theo believes that if the society does not make this
pareto improvement it will consider another one which does
benefit him. Then he may oppose this one in the hope that the next
one will be made instead. We can show that this situation can lead
a society to reject all pareto improvements. Imagine that the
society is a democracy of three members, Theo, Saundra, and
Denise, and policies are decided on by voting for each policy in
turn. Suppose that the policy being considered is a pareto
improvement that benefits Saundra, but leaves Theo and Denise
the same. In Table 1, A is such a policy. If Theo and Denise think
that they will be able to replace it with a policy that benefits them,
for example, B or C, respectively, then they will vote against the
policy under consideration. The three of them might, for this
reason, be unable to come to agreement on any pareto
improvement at all, since any two of them could be looking ahead
to another policy that would benefit them more, and hence each
policy is defeated by a vote of 2 to 1.
Table 1
Theo
Saundra
Denise
Initial allocation
100
100
100
Policy A
100
200
100
Policy B
200
100
100
Policy C
100
100
200
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Furthermore, the assumptions of the PCM rule out important
aspects of strategic behavior, and thus put in question the
rationality recommendations derived from the PCM model. The
PCM guarantees that there are no opportunities for strategic
behavior by precluding force and fraud, and by assuming away
opportunities for collusion. But this means that agents will not
exercise strategic rationality, either because they may not or
because the opportunities don't arise. In a theory of justice, the
claim that force and fraud must be precluded (and what that
amounts to) should be a theorem, not a postulate. This is especially
true if the theory purports to derive the constraints of justice from
rationality, as it is in the welfare economics argument, since agents
will find this restriction arbitrary from the point of view of
rationality. Otherwise, force and fraud have to be ruled out by a
prior moral claim, making morality theoretically prior to justice.
If we drop the assumptions that rule out strategic rationality, then
there is no guarantee that pareto optimality will arise from free
trade, since individuals may be defrauded to make trades that they
would not want to make were they not defrauded. The no-collusion
idealization of the PCM (C3) is also a problem for the rationality
argument, since in a model that resembles ours in the sense that
there are many opportunities for collusion, one cannot show that
pareto optimality arises from free trade. Thus, for the purposes of
defending the pareto criterion on grounds of rationality, the PCM
is not robust.
David Gauthier, in Morals By Agreement, defends pareto
optimality as a criterion of impartiality in the PCM. Gauthier
argues that the PCM is a "morally free zone," that in it morality is
neither necessary nor possible. Morality for Gauthier consists in
the constraints individuals agree to place on their pursuit of
unbridled self-interest, in order to make possible cooperation for
mutual advantage. In the PCM, however, there is no need for
cooperation to achieve the greatest possible social and individual
welfare; the competitive outcome is pareto optimal. Thus, he
claims, there is no need for morality. And since any changes in
the distribution of goods from the competitive outcome would
make some worse off, it is not possible to come to mutual
agreement on any constraints on the pursuit of self-interest. So
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morality is also impossible in the PCM, But there is nonetheless
a moral quality that Gauthier points to, and that is that the PCM is
impartial. A process is impartial if it does not unfairly benefit or
burden anyone, Gauthier's claim is that the market confers benefits
and burdens only on those who freely contract for them, to the
extent to which they contract for them.
Gauthier argues that three features constitute the impartiality of
the PCM: (1) there is free activity—individuals enter into only
those interactions that they choose; (2) there are no externalities;
and (3) the outcome is pareto optimal. It is immediately clear
why the first two should be criteria of impartiality: without free
activity some could be forced to conform their behavior to others'
wishes; and if there were externalities, then someone's endowment
would be seized or damaged without her permission, or someone
would benefit without sharing the cost of production ofthe benefit.
In either case some would be burdened for the benefit of others.
Gauthier argues that pareto optimality is also a criterion of
impartiality with the following ingenious argument. In a PCM the
unique pareto optimal outcome from that initial distribution is the
only possible one in which everyone gets what, and only what, she
pays for. We can see this by imagining that we enforce a move
from a pareto optimal outcome to another outcome that does not
worsen everyone, It is worth quoting Gauthier at length;
[E]veiy alternative [to the competitive outcome] must involve a diminution in
some person's utility, and we may treat this as either a loss of benefits or an
increase in costs. If tJte former, then the person will not receive some benefit for
which in free interaction she paid the cost; if the latter, then the person must pay
some costs in addition to those that in free interaction were sufficient to cover
all of her benefits. In either case her interests are prejudicially affected, and she
may reason^ly complain, if someone else enjoys an increase in benefits or a
reduction in costs, that the other person has benefitted at her expense.
So from the perspective of the competitive outcome, any other
state would penalize some, possibly for the benefit of others, and
thus would be partial.
If impartiality is required by justice, Gauthier's argument
would seem to show that pareto optimality is a criterion of justice.
That is not to say that pareto optimality guarantees justice, but that
it is a necessary condition of justice. Another necessary condition
12 Ann E. Cudd
of justice in the market is that the initial endowments of the agents
are just. Given ajust starting point, an impartial process preserves
justce.
Gauthier makes this argument only for the PCM, however. Can
the argument be extended to the real world in which the conditions
of the PCM don't hold? Not straightforwardly, because there is no
pareto optimal point from which to begin—outside the PCM there
may not be an achievable pareto optimal outcome—or to get to.
Yet his argument seems to depend on there being an anchor point
from which the alternative unjustly penalizes someone. What if,
instead of forecasting a pareto optimal state, we look at each
potential pareto improvement in turn and apply Gauthier's
argument to isolated pareto improvements? That is, suppose that
we begin with state A, and A' offers some pareto improvement.
Can we give an argument similar to the above to show that justice
requires that we make it?
Again the answer is no. Recall the argument to show that pareto
improvements are not rationally required. If some agents foresee
better opportunities in the future by rejecting a proposed pareto
improvement, they may rationally refuse it. The difference
between this case and the PCM is that given an initial starting point
there is only one pareto optimal point that is possible in the PCM,
but in this case we are considering only pareto improvements, of
which there may be many, each with different beneficiaries, and
each with uncertain paths into the future. There can be no
guarantee that all would agree on any given pareto improvement.
Equally, they may refuse it on other moral grounds. For it may be
the case that by refusing A' a new opportunity A" arises which
benefits more (though maybe not the same) individuals or
individuals who are somehow more deserving. Thus the
impartiality argument from the PCM is also not robust to relaxing
its assumptions.
2. Arguments for Pareto Optimality from the OP
Contractarians take justice to be the outcome of a pre-cooperative
situation in which the guidelines for cooperative social interaction
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are agreed upon by more orless rational individuals. Contractarian
theories try to avoid, as much as possible, imposing a conception
of the social good, apart from weak assumptions about what the
individuals in the pre-cooperative state can be supposed to want,
and allow the citizens of the state to come to agreement on
constraints on their individual pursuit of the good. The contrac-
tarian test of principles of justice is not only whether the individu-
als would agree to them in the initial situation, but also whether
they remain motivated to comply with the principles in the future,
and whether the social order that arises from that compliance is
In this section I examine three contractarian arguments that bear
on the pareto criterion and that begin from the Rawlsian OP. I am
not attempting to provide a general critique of Rawls's Theory of
Justice here, however. My aim is simply to examine arguments for
pareto optimality as a criterion of justice that arise from
deliberation about instrumental rationality in the Rawlsian OP.
The first argument I shall examine is Rawls's lexical maximin
argument for the difference principle and the second is an
argument developed by Prakash Shenoy and Rex Martin for a
Rawlsian conclusion on the pareto criterion, the "collective asset
argument." Finally I consider an argument of Gauthier from the
conditions on individual rationaliW in the OP.
In Rawls's A Theory of Justice the original position consists
of equal, rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance who
choose the principles of justice to govern the basic structure of
society. The veil shields them from knowledge of their particular
preferences, talents, attributes, and social positions. Since they
know nothing of themselves which would differentiate them as
individuals, and they are equally rational, there is no room for
disagreement on the principles ofjustice; what will seem agreeable
to one will be agreeable to all. Rawls argues that in this ideal
situation the familiar two principles ofjustice, lexically ordered,
would be chosen:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both;
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(a) to the greatest beneftt of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle, and
(b) attached lo offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity.
Since the ordering is lexical, Rawls gives higher priority to con-
cerns of "equal basic liberties." But in the second principle Rawls
makes distribution the other basic concern of justice. The first
thing to notice is that inequalities are specifically allowed by part
(a) ofthe second principle, usually called the difference principle,
Rawls claims both that the principles of justice are compatible with
efficiency, and that justice is prior to efficiency.
[I]n justice as fairness the principles of justice are prior to considerations of
efficiency and therefore, roughly speaking, the interior points that represent just
distributions will generally be preferred to efficient points which represent
unjust distributions.
To illustrate, suppose that we have a society of two individuals, i
and j , in state A, and consider three other possible social states, B,
C, and D, with cardinal utility profiles as follows.
Table 2
A B C D
100
State B is a pareto improvement on A, C is a pareto improvement
on B, and D is a pareto improvement on C, Rawls (most plausibly)
uses the lexical maximin principle which requires that once the
position ofthe worst off has been maximized, the second worst
off member's position should be maximized, and so on until the
best off member's position is maximized. Using this principle
to make the argument, (which I will call the "lexical maximin
argument"), the difference principle is amended to read "to every-
one's advantage," and it is sometimes referred to as the lexical
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difference principle. The lexical difference principle chooses D
in the example above; this way Rawls can validate his claim that:
The problem is to choose between [the mai^ efificient arrangements of the basic
structure], to find a conception of justice that singles out one of these efficient
distributions as also jnst. If we succeed in this, we shall have gone beyond mere
efficiency yet in a way compatible with it.
But if the lexical maximin argument is taken as the argument for
the two principles, then justice is not simply "prior to" efficiency,
rather it requires efficiency. Equality, for instance, is shown by this
example not to be a criterion of justice if D is chosen over C.
Rawls's lexical maximin argument relies crucially on the veil
of ignorance of the original position. Lexical maximin is only a
plausible choice rule if there is no good basis for estimating the
probabilities of future possible states. One unassailable principle
of rational decision is that one ought to use all of the information
one has available, if only by choosing to ignore it because of time
or calculation constraints. When good probability estimates of the
future are available, expected utility maximization, weighted by
one's risk posture, is a more reasonable choice rule than lexical
maximin. But in any actual situation in which the principles of
justice are to be applied, there is more information available about
future possible states. So the plausibility of lexical maximin relies
on the unique ignorance of persons in the OR
The contractarian must also convince us that rational
individuals will continue to comply with the agreement in society.
If individuals feel that, knowing now what the outcome of their
agreement is, they could make a better agreement if a renegotiation
were forced, then they would press for renegotiation, and thus fail
to comply with the rules based on the original two principles.
Since the plausibility of the choice rule in the OP depends on its
artificially imposed ignorance, people outside the OP will not be
motivated to comply if they feel they could have done better had
they known more about themselves. Thus compliance with the two
principles is questionable even if they do agree to the principles
in the OP. Compliance and agreement are symmetric. Seeing that
they would not be inclined to comply with the agreement, the
individuals in the OP would not be inclined to make it on the basis
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of lexical maximin, indeed they may even agree to wait until they
have more information before agreeing on principles of justice.
The problem I find with the OP, then, is that by changing a few
assumptions slightly, for example, by letting the agents know what
their special talents are, the argument for the lexical difference
principle fails. In this sense, then, the argument fails to be robust:
it is a theoretical failure of the idealization. That differs from the
failure of robustness in the case of the PCM, which is an empirical
failure. Nonetheless, the Rawlsian OP is not a robust contractarian
• - 3 1model for the lexical maximin argument for the pareto cntenon.
Lexical maximin is not the only possible argument for the
difference principle, and so also for the pareto criterion. Shenoy
and Martin prove that if chain connection" is supposed, then
the difference principle is equivalent to choosing the pareto
optimal states of affairs from among a set of possible states of
affairs, and then choosing from this smaller set the state of affairs
that is most egalitarian. Martin '̂* argues that the pareto optimality
half of this principle follows from Rawls's idea of collective
assets; I shall call this the "collective asset argument." This
argument supports pareto optimality only as the third criterion to
be applied, and then only when chain connection holds. Recall
that for Rawls the principles of justice are lexically ordered, which
means that the second principle is to be applied only to the set of
distributions which meets the criteria in the first principle, which
requires equal basic liberties. The second principle is then
composed of two parts lexically ordered. On Martin's
interpretation, first fair equality of opportunity should be secured
and only then should the difference principle be applied. So the
collective asset argument is designed to support pareto optimality
only from the feasible set whittled down by both the first principle
and the principle of fair equality of opportunity. These principles
may constrict the set the difference principle is applied to in one
of two ways: it may leave the pareto frontier untouched at some
points, removing only those points that represent gross
inequalities, as in Figure la, or it may shift the feasible set in,
precluding all pareto optimal outcomes, as in Figure lb.
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If chain connection holds, that is, if the prospects of all are rising
whenever the prospects of the best off and the worst off are, then
we have a case like that in Figure la. Shenoy and Martin claim
that their pareto optima! ity-egalitarian criterion is equivalent to
the difference principle only in those cases where chain connection
holds. And so I shall evaluate the collective assets argument
assuming chain connection.
Rawls argues that talents and abilities which one is bom with
are morally arbitrary, or undeserved. The distribution of natural
assets is a natural fact, but what difference they make to
individuals is determined by social institutions. This is true in two
senses. Which talents are valued depends on whether they can ever
come to light or be rewarded; being able to jump very well and
having great eye-hand coordination was not very useful in
Victorian England, though now in the U.S. men with such abilities
can become rich and famous in the NBA. Secondly, how the
rewards to the talents are distributed depends on social institutions.
The idea ofjustice as fairness is that "men agree to share one
another's fate. In designing institutions they undertake to avail
themselves of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only
when doing so is for the common benefit." Hence natural assets
should be used as collective assets for the benefit of all. This
principle of mutual benefit may be understood as claiming that the
assets ought to be used to benefit the greatest number. Normally
this means that all continuously improve their position. But if only
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one portion of society can benefit, then the asset ought to he used
for their henefit rather than wasted, so long as no one is worsened.
Now if we can make a change that benefits some without harming
anyone, then by the mutual benefit principle the change ought to
be made, unless there is a better change that benefits more. This
shows that all pareto non-optimal states (that fall within the
constraints imposed by the lexically prior principles of justice) are
inferior to some pareto optimal states, so none ofthe non-optimal
states ought to be chosen.
The main objection to pareto optimality is the objection from
envy. The objection from envy is an individual's objection to the
effect that he does not want others to be better off than he. Rawls
rules out reasoning from envy in the OP for two reasons. The moral
reason is that envy is "generally regarded as something to be
avoided and feared and so ought not to count as a reason for
decisions in the OP. Second, envy is a special emotion that is not
always generated, and so Rawls assumes it away for the sake of
simplicity. Nonetheless, he recognizes that it could become a
destabilizing force in society, and thus he needs to examine the
society that is ordered by the two principles to see if they are
subject to envy. The kind of envy that is dangerous, Rawls argues,
is "the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others
even though their being more fortunate than we are does not detract
from our advantages." Rawls allows that envy is a legitimate
concern of justice when inequalities are so great that they
undermine individuals' bases for self-respect. But, he argues, such
envy doesn't arise in the well-ordered society based on the two
principles of justice, since it is designed specifically to further the
bases for individuals' self-respect. Hence it need not be a concem
for the individuals in the OP.
Rawls's argument that destructive envy will not arise in the
society ordered by the two principles is quite plausible. However,
the flip side of envy, which is jealousy, cannot be so easily disposed
of, and will, I think, particularly affect the collective assets idea.
Jealousy occurs when one has possession of a relatively rare good
that one does not want to share, or others to get more of Jealousy
is dangerous for Rawls's two principles if it causes individuals to
renegotiate outside the OP. Talents and attributes exist attached to
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individuals; they do not exist in a storehouse to be divided up
among all members of society, although it could easily seem that
way to those in the OP. Individuals who possess talents and
attributes as part of their hands, bodies, brains want to benefit from
them, and will regard them jealously the more that they must use
them for others' benefit. Since they know that in a system of
natural liberty they would benefit, those who have talents will be
motivated to renegotiate. The veil of ignorance in the OP makes
it impossible for individuals to guard against this, since ignorance
of their talents persuades them to share the assets collectively. In
other words, they agree out of aversion to risk. But if individuals
will not subsequently comply with (legislation constructed against
a background constitution based on) the two principles, the
response to envy also fails, since it relies on the OP and the two
principles. The veil of ignorance makes the two principles
plausible in the OP, but it is an artificial device which, when drawn
aside as it must be in society, takes with it the appeal of the
principles. Thus the OP argument for the pareto criterion is not
robust to realistic adjustments.
Gauthier, in "Justice and Natural Endowment: Toward a
Critique of Rawls's Ideological Framework," argues that in the
OP pareto optimality is a condition on individual rationality for
the kind of individuals we find in the OP, what he calls
"every man." Given the information conditions of the OP, and the
principle ofrationality that each maximizes her expected outcome,
everyman wants to maximize the expectation of each, but since he
could be any of these, he wants to maximize the expectation of
any one individual only as long as the expectations of each other
individual are not lowered. Hence it is rational as an everyman in
the OP to agree only to those principles of justice which guarantee
that there is no way that one individual's expectation could be
increased without lowering that of any other by rejecting those
principles of justice. But this just is the pareto criterion. Again,
however, this reasoning only makes sense within the OP, where
one's sense of an individual's interests is limited. Individuals do
have interests that can oppose pareto optimality even if they are
not envious: an individual rationally prefers a pareto non-optimal
situation where he does better to a pareto optimal situation where
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he does worse. The OP gives individuals a kind of anonymity that
they might rationally reject outside it
3. Pareto Optimality as a Regulative Ideal of Justice
We have seen that several crucial problems arise in the real world
for the arguments for the claim that pareto optimality is a criterion
of justice. The PCM arguments are ruled out because the oppor-
tunities for force and fraud and strategic behavior on the part of
real individuals derail the argument that guarantees that a pareto
optimal outcome will arise in the free market. Gauthier's argument
from the PCM model founders when we relax the assumption that
information about the future is perfect or that we can always
forecast a static pareto optimal state. The Rawlsian arguments are
ruled out because the principles of justice fail the compliance test
outside the veil of ignorance imposed in the OP, and thus would
not be chosen to begin with.
In this section I shall attempt to give a different contractarian
argument for the claim that pareto optimality is a condition of
justice that avoids the problems with the arguments I have
examined, In particular, then, the argument must not rely on the
PCM, and it must solve the compliance problem; it must allow for
the possibility of change in the future, and must not require that
there be no externalities.
To begin, I imagine a situation in which individuals know their
talents, attributes, and limitations, and although they make
reasonable estimates about their possible futures, they may
disagree with one another about the feasibility of future states. I
will imagine that individuals are rational, that they want to further
their own best interests, and that they appreciate the fact that
society can be, in the Rawlsian phrase, "a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage." Their primary motivation to justice is the
cooperative surplus, but they are also capable of a sense of justice,
so that they also develop an affective attachment to societies and
principles they believe to be in the best interest of the long-term
cooperative enterprise. In this environment, just policy decisions
are those decisions on which all would agree and with which all
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would comply. Gauthier, in Morals By Agreement, provided an
argument for the existence of moral constraints which would meet
these requirements, and I shall assume that they exist in roughly
that form for this paper. The question to be asked now is: will
pareto optimality be a condition of just policies in such a society?
In this environment there is not enough information about the
future to specify the pareto optimal states, and since we are not
assuming away the possibility of force or fraud or collusion, it is
not clear that pareto optimality would arise from apparently
voluntary transactions anyway. The imperfections in the model
force us to consider choices among altemative social policies,
some of which offer pareto improvements over the status quo.
Since fmding the pareto optimal states of affairs assumes an
artificial static endpoint, I shall consider the pareto principle to
require simply that some pareto improvement be made whenever
one can be.
First I want to establish that, facing a set of pareto improving
policies, the contractarian notion of justice does not allow every
pareto improvement to be refused. To see this let us consider the
process of coming to agreement on social policies that affect utility
distribution. Two questions have to be answered to begin with: (1)
how is the decision to be made? (2) how are the gains from the
policy to be divided? The two are interconnected in any society
concerned with justice, since agreement on the first point will
depend on agreement on the second. If the gains are not justly
distributed, then the policy decision is not necessarily just either.
Further, a third question arises in considering the process of
coming to agreement on the second: (3) is envy to count as a reason
for refusing agreement?
We can begin by showing that envy is not a rational objection
to a proposed policy, and hence will not be used by rational agents.
An objection is envious if the objector raises it only to block gains
by others. To allow envy to count is to jeopardize all agreements
that do not equally benefit all persons. Then any person can expect
that many policies that would benefit her, even if they harm no
one, would be refused, and this is something no one would want.
If one policy is refused because it leads to envy, it may engender
a spiteful response (i.e., someone might respond by pretending
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envy even when they don't feel it in order to "get back at" someone
who previously objected enviously) which might then be used as
a reason to refuse another policy. Thus a just society, one that wants
agreements that will be complied with, will agree not to count each
others' envy as reasons. Now one might object that the
rationality of ruling out envy depends on how likely it is that one
expects to be on the winning side rather than the losing one. But
I think not. Only the person in the worst position could be
unconcerned by the prospect of another's envy ruling out one's
best social policies, and so fmd it rational not to rule out objections
from envy. If one ever foresees being in a position other than that
bottom position, then one would be concemed about it. It seems
unreasonable to suppose that anyone would ever be in this
position. Agents will comply with this agreement as long as they
foresee future interactions in which they benefit differentially.
In a contractarian theory, the answer to (1), how the decision is
to be made, is that all must agree. Since our interest concems the
pareto principle, we want to know whether rational individuals
agree to make pareto improvements. One difficulty arises when
there are several pareto improvements from which to choose, or
different routes to end-states that are pareto non-comparable and
have different implications for different individuals. Let us look
at an example, illustrated in Table 3 below. Suppose that the
society is at state A and may choose policies that lead to
development B and then B', or C followed by C , or D followed
by D'. If it were considered as the only altemative, B would be
pareto optimal. Since they consider no altemative that anyone
likes better and no one argues from envy, B is chosen. However,
as in the earlier Theo-Saundra-Denise example of Table 1, when
there are other possible altematives with different implications for
the individuals, the situation changes. How are just societies to
evaluate these possibilities? First we can rule out the status quo
(A). For to remain at the status quo is in the first period to penalize
one of the two individuals, and in the second period it would
penalize both. We can also rule out development B followed by
B', since the ultimate state, B', is pareto inferior to the ultimate
state in either of the other two development routes, which for this
case are pareto optimal, and there being no envy would be chosen
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over B'. Between C followed by C' and D followed by D' the
pareto principle makes no choice, for C and D' are pareto
non-comparable, and so, one might argue, C C and DD' taken
together are as well. The choice of the two is a bargaining problem,
to be solved by other principles of justice, or principles of
rationality in bargaining.
Table 3
A B B' C C D D'
Bob 1 1 2 3 3 2 2
Sarah 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
There are three important differences between our analysis in
this case and that of the Theo-Saundra-Denise case. First, in this
case we look beyond the first changes forged by the policies to
future developments from those changes. This causes Sarah to
prefer D to B and C, even though in the first period of the policy
implementation there is no difference for her in the three. Second,
we have ruled out envy explicitly. This means that between the B,
C, and D possibilities, C and D are the ones to be considered. But
at this point we would face the same problem as before, were it
not for the final difference in the examples. Third, we allow the
parties to bargain, rather than only to vote.
This argument can be extended by induction to any number of
development steps into the future to show that if all possible
improvements are considered together, not all pareto
improvements may be refused. Considered together, no individual
has an incentive to refuse all of them, since none make him worse
off and some may benefit him. And he has no reason to refuse all
of them, since he cannot, by hypothesis, hold out for a better one,
and envy cannot count as a just reason. While this does not show
us which improvement should be chosen, it does suggest that
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justice requires that some improvement be made when a pareto
improvement is possible.
The only uncertainty now is over which pareto improvement to
make, or question (2) above. Can any answer to this question lead
us to revise our answer to question (1), that is, is there a compliance
problem, consideration of which leads us to reject the pareto
principle? Yes. The problem of choosing the particular future state
to implement is a social choice problem that must take distribution
into account in the very making of the agreement; agreement on
pareto improvements hangs on the distributions they provide.
There seem to be three ways to make the choice: a preset rule, such
as Rawls's difference principle, or a voting rule, or bargaining. As
long as one of these will guarantee compliance, the pareto
principle survives. Voting rules are subject to paradoxes and
agenda setting. Preset rules are likely to be violated by
predetermined losers, as I argued will result from the collective
assets argument. Bargaining takes each individual's concems into
account bv letting each represent herself in each policy decision
situation. Each wants to settle but can only offer so much to the
social whole for a settlement on his favorite. The one who gains
most will be able to redistribute most to buy agreement from
others. Since agreement has to be unanimous, and all want an
agreement that will be complied with, there is no incentive to agree
and then renege. One who would renege would rather hold out on
the agreement, since reneging damages future prospects for
agreement. Yet no one holds out forever, since that too damages
future prospects for agreement, and amounts to rejection of the
agreement out of envy. Acceptance of any agreement at all
requires that all are reasonably sure that it will command
compliance.
One might argue that I have simply given an argument for
bargaining over voting here. That response seems partially right;
my argument is an argument for bargaining over voting.
Bargaining provides the way to split up the social product without
having to sacrifice pareto optimality, allowing each person to
make a claim, an argument, for herself The great advantage of
bargaining is that it allows one to divide the whole social product;
in bargaining, rationality requires that the outcome be pareto
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optimal. So if the argument is an argument for bargaining, then it
is an argument for pareto optimality as a requirement of rationality,
as well.
Notice that to secure the agreement and compliance through
bargaining in a dynamic world, society must take a broad view of
potential pareto improvements, so that no one's potentially best
pareto improvements are left unconsidered. To assure compliance,
the outcome must be rational for each and it must begin from an
49acceptable bargaining position, and being rational for each, the
bargain is just. If there were any pareto improvements yet to be
made, someone would have reason not to comply, and having
reason not to comply, others would not agree. Thus the outcome
of the bargain may not be pareto inferior to any other.
On the contractarian view, justice is forged through agreement
on the social structure, in which each individual seeks his own best
outcome, but all are concerned to achieve a pareto optimum where
possible, or to capture the optimal combination of pareto
improvements. Just persons must be willing to entertain dialogue
about pareto improvements, and to bargain with others over the
gains from those improvements. For without this there is no
compliance, and there being no compliance there would be no
agreement. Considered all together, everyone wants agreement on
some pareto improvement, yet all realize that agreement on any
depends on the right compromise on distribution. I shall call
someone who holds the view that pareto optimality is a criterion
of a contractarian theory ofjustice aparetian contractarian.
There remain two troubling objections for the paretian
contractarian. Both objections claim that information
requirements for using the pareto principle to make social
decisions in the way I have advocated are too extensive for it to
be useful in the real world. One concerns the difficulty of
predicting the course of future development, and the other
concerns the information that must be gathered about individual
preferences in different social states. Regarding the first problem,
one needs to know all the possible pareto improvements that can
be made now, and the possible ramifications for the future that can
be expected from each of them. Clearly this is a strict requirement.
Without this information, though, unexpected possibilities could
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arise which cause individuals to renege on their agreements,
seeing that their interests were not fully considered in the original
agreement.
The paretian contractarian might respond in one of two ways.
First he may argue that pareto improvements of any kind are
valuable, so even if a potential pareto improvement is overlooked,
the one that is made is not against justice. But this response will
not do because the argument that the bargain would be complied
with depended on each person's favorite pareto improvement
being recognized and considered in the bargain. If an individual
believes that she might do better by holding out for some as yet
unrecognized improvement, then compliance breaks down.
Second he may respond that all possible pareto improvements,
discounted by their probability of successful achievement, are to
be considered in the bargain. But unless all agents agree on the
possible improvements and their probabilities, compliance and
agreement break down once again.
The other information difficulty is how to obtain the preferences
ofindividuals for different social states. In orderto compare social
states, individuals have to know what their welfare is in those
states. Their welfare can be determined objectively or subjectively.
I have assumed a subjective conception of utility in this paper, and
would argue that it is the only one that is compatible with
contractarianism; an objective assessment of welfare would not
ensure compliance. But to make subjective assessments,
individuals have to know what they would prefer if they were the
persons in the alternative states. If the preferences are themselves
state-dependent, then this is a serious difficulty in forecasting.
What happens if they are wrong, for example, if an individual
supposes she would be very happy in a state in which she turns
out to be miserable? Again, compliance would be threatened if
that state came about, and knowing this is possible, compliance
and agreement are threatened in the present contemplation of the
future state.
I have argued that at least three epistemological difficulties
become very important for questions of justice: the difficulty of
defming the pareto frontier, the difficulty of imagining possible
futures and their consequences for the distribution of goods, and
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the difficulty of projecting one's preference orderings in different
future possible states. Added to these is the difficulty in making
these items of knowledge common knowledge in a society, as they
must be for effective and fair bargaining. These difficulties surely
are, in a precise sense, insuperable for human minds. On the other
hand, they are, under other descriptions, the kinds of things that
ordinary conversations and political debates consider all the time.
Justice requires that we come to some agreement on social states,
and if this comes about as a kind of bargain, then what drives
agreement is the belief that each is making in some sense an equal
sacrifice of the cooperative surplus in order to get agreement.'
The only way that the belief can be generated and shared is if the
bargain takes place by means of shared public discussions and
democratic institutions, in which reasons are given and asked for
against a set of shared norms for justification, and in which each
feels her voice is heard. So in seeking general criteria of justice,
an examination of pareto optimality suggests that we ought to
choose ajust democratic process as much as ajust outcome cri-
terion.
There is another reason to believe that the process of coming to
agreementis as importantforjustice as securingthe pareto frontier.
Individuals are sometimes not rational, and so we might imagine
that sometimes they will not agree to even an obvious pareto
improvement. If we were to say that pareto optimality is a
necessary criterion of justice, then should it not be imposed on
them? Since no one is in the epistemic situation to know that a
policy guarantees pareto optimality now and into the future, there
is no one who can justifiably impose such a change. So it is better
to invest in a process that is likely to bring about agreement and
compliance, that often results in mutual gains, and that avoids
taking account of envy. But the process cannot be chosen outside
of all considerations ofthe content ofthe agreement either. In order
to secure agreement, those best able to stall agreement have to be
content with their share. And this means that the content ofthe
agreement is as important to securing it as the process is.
The objections presented in this section show that the pareto
criterion cannot be an operative criterion for societies. It is not
possible to project a determinate pareto optimal state, and even
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less is it possible for persons to know all possible pareto
improvements or even their preferences over them. But the
argument against using envy as a legitimate objection to proposed
social arrangements suggests that the pareto criterion is a plausible
regulative ideal. That is, if we could have the ideal information
about society that we would need in order to know what
improvements are possible, and we could know our preferences
over them, and we had common knowledge of these facts, then the
pareto principle would be justifiable. Lacking such knowledge,
however, we can glean from this discussion ofthe problems that
arise in the search for just social policies that it must take into
account the possible futures that all individuals look to in
formulating their preferences and concerns. Though I began with
a question that apparently concerned static distributions of goods,
I have argued that in a dynamic world we cannot come to a firm
conclusion about the relation of pareto optimality to justice in
distribution. However, we are able to draw conclusions about the
process of making just distributive policies. If there is to be
agreement at all, individuals have to bargain over the possible
futures in good faith, making reasonable judgments about the
consequences and feasibility of each others' visions ofthe future,
and engaging in give and take for the sake of cooperative
agreements in the future. This means that for the sake of
agreement, and so justice, individuals will have to participate in
policy formation. They will have to insure that their visions ofthe
future will be heard and evidence and argument for it presented.
And finally this means that individuals will have to be ready to
consider futures that may be contrary to their traditions and
prejudices and apparent immediate self-interest for the sake of
cooperation, that is to say, for the sake of their enlightened
self-interest in the face of an uncertain future.
Notes
1. This paper will not consider whether the "distributive paradigm" of justice,
which takes social justice to depend largely on the distribution of goods in
society, is the appropriate framework for discussions of justice. I am going
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to be working within that paradigm. However, Iris Young, Justice and the
Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J,: Princeton University Press, 1990),
provides an interesting critique ofthe distributive paradigm. See esp, chap.
1.1 shall respond simply that distribution of goods is surely part of justice,
though surely also not the whole of it.
2. Butsee JulianLe Grand, "Equity versus Efficiency: The Elusive TradeKiff,"
Ethics 100(1990): 554-68 for a discussion of some problems with identify-
ing pareto optimality and efficiency.
3. \^lfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy (New Yoiic: Austus M.
Kelley, 1971),chap.6.
4. I am using "welfarist" in the sense of Amartya Sen, See On Ethics and
Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), which refers to theories which
take the justice or goodness of a society to be completely determined by the
utilities of the individuals in it.
5. An example of a welfare economist using pareto optimality as a normative
criterion is Gordon Tullock, "Inheritance Justified," Journal of Law and
Economics 13 (1970): 465-74.
6. These criteria are redundant to some extent. In particular, Cl, C3, C4, C5
would be sufficient to characterize the PCM, properly understood. I add the
others just to make the conditions clear.
7. See Richard Thaler, "Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Eco-
nomics," in Alvin Roth, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 99-130, for a review of
experimental evidence of violations of economic assumptions about human
behavior.
8. Recall that there are no transaction costs, so that if a pereon is indifferent to
a trade there is no sense in which he would prefer not to trade; we shall
suppose that in these cases the indifferent i)arty makes the trade.
9. But see Allan Gibbard, "What's Morally Special About Free Exchange?" in
Ethics and Economics, E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul, eds, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985), pp, 20-29, for a criticism ofthe notion that
free exchange is prima facie a good thing.
10. Hal R. Varian, "Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theoiy of
Fairness," Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1974-75): IHAI. Reprinted in
Hahn and HolUs, eds.. Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979).
11. Building a lighthouse is rational whenever the expected value of the light-
house is less than the expected cost of the iighthoxise. For a large and
profitable enough shipping company, that would be the case for some
locations.
12. It is not quite a unanimous opinion in the economics literature that exter-
nalities harm third parties, that is, persons who are not party to trades.
However, the argument that externalities are harmless depends on the
assumption that costs of making voluntaiy agreements are completely
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uniform across the market, and this is cleariy violated in the world. See
James M. Buchanan, "The Relevance of Pareto Optimality," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 6 (1962): 341-54; esp. p, 349.
13. For a stimulating discussion of other problems with the welfare economics
treatment of pareto optimality and justice, see Le Grand, op. cit.
14. David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986) (hereafter "ME^").
15. Again, however, there must be no force or fraud in the PCM. Hence there
must be some prior, apparently moral, constraint, contra Gauthier.
16. Daniel M. Hausman, "Are Markets Morally Free Zones?" Philosophy and
Public Affairs 18 (1989): 317-33, interprets Gauthier as saying that impar-
tiality is a result ofthe lack of externalities, not the pareto optimality ofthe
maiket. But it seems clear from what Gauthier s^s at Mfl4, pp. 96-97,and
from the way that he makes the argument for the impartiality ofthe market,
as I show shortly, that he intends that pareto optimality is a condition of
impartiality in the PCM.
17. MBA, p. 97. Note that he goes on to qualify the argument in one way: if the
maiket outcome includes rent, which would happen if there were a fixed
supply of a good lower than what would be demanded at the equilibrium
price, then "optimah^ does not straightforwardly ensure that any altemative
that was not worse for everyone would benefit some individuals at the
expense of others" (p. 98).
Hausman, op. cit., argues that rents can be generated in the PCM (p. 326)
provided only that individuals have different levels of talents and/or endow-
ments. He argues further that pecuniaiy externalities can arise in the PCM
when technologies are allowed to change (pp. 328-29). Thus the PCM can
only be morally free under veiy restrictive conditions, conditions which
Hausman claims make the argument trivial. This argument does not affect
the claim I am concemed with, that pareto optimality is a condition of
impartiality. But 1 am essentially agreeing with Hausman's claim.
18. In private correspondence, David Gauthier tells me that this interpretation
of his argument is not quite what he had intended. He points out that any
pareto optimal altemative from the one in the PCM would also not be
impartial, since it would benefit those for whom the altemative is preferable,
at the expense of those for whom it is less preferred.
19. Recent woric in ethics, especially by feminist ethicists, has given us reason
to question the assumption that impartiality is a hallmark of justice. See
Marilyn Friedman, What Are Friends For? (Ithaca: Comell University
Press, 1993), for an exemplary discussion of these issues.
20. While Gauthier emphasizes the compliance problem in his contractarian
project, Rawls talks about the stability of the just society. This tums out to
be more than a semantic difference. Gauthier appeals to instmmental ration-
ality to construct his theoiy of justice, Rawls to a broader conception of
. I take it that if a theoiy of justice is instnimentally irrational in
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the sense that it cannot solve the compliance problem, that theoiy is seriously
flawed.
21. Social contracts are to be understood as self enforcing agreements, that is,
as agreements which, once made, will be complied with because both the
agreement and the subsequent compliance is rational.
22. RexMar\in,Rawls and Rights (LawrQncQ,K3irL: University Press of Kansas,
1985).
23. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971) (hereafter " r r ) .
24. TJ, p. 302. This is the "full statement" ofthe two principles. Martin, op. cit.,
presents the second principle ordered the other way, that is, with fair equality
of opportunity coming before the difference principle. But this quote from
Rawls matches, in the ordering of the principles, his presentation ofthe two
principles on pp. 60, 83, and 250, as well.
25. TJ, p. 69.
26. There are two complicating features of Rawls's account that I am glossing
over here. First, the two principles are to guide the design of the institutional
framewoik and only indirectly the distribution of goods. But since it is the
distribution of goods that rational individuals would look to in deciding on
the principles, this simplification is generally a reasonable one. Second,
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it is better from the point of view of justice either to allow individuals more
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27. The formal condition is nicely put by Shenoy in Martin, op. cit., p. 198, as
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28. See 77, pp. 81-83.
29. 77, pp. 70-71.
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sense of justice that gives them an interest in being just and encouraging
justice to solve the stability problem, his analogue to the compliance
problem. This cannot be a rational sentiment if my criticism ofthe OP holds.
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31. The failure of Rawls's model is not the same as that ofthe PCM. The PCM
purports to be an empirical idealization of life, while the OP is an idealiza-
tion of a hypothetical initial state. I thank Geoff Sayre-McCord for pointing
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32. Martin, op. cit.
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beyond what could be obtained in "general egoism"] is less than that of some other
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41. Seen. 31.
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44.1 thank an anoi^mous referee for raising this objection.
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several choices that are pareto non-comparable to the status quo, as in the
following example.
Bob
Sarah
A
1
100
B
10
99
C
98
98
In this example all three choices are pareto non-comparable. Thus the pareto
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46. See for example, Charles R. Plott and Michael E. Levine, "A Model of
Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review
68 (1978): 146-60, and Robin Farquharson, Theory of Voting (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969).
47. Not eveiy bargaining structure will guarantee that each person's concerns
receive equal consideration. I have in mind Gauthier's minimax relative
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51. Gauthier provides an interesting discussion of how one might move from
strategic bargaining to democratic politics in "Constituting Democracy,"
given as the 1989 E.H. Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas.
52.1 would like to thank Neal Becker, David Gautliier, Rex Martin, Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord, and an anoi^mous reviewer for veiy helpful comments on
34 Ann E. Cudd
an earlier draft. I gratefully acknowledge the University of Kansas for a grant
from the General Research Fund, proposal #91-103, for woik on this paper.
Ann E. Cudd
Department of Philosophy
University of Kansas
acudd@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

